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1 Introduction
Thanks to works such as Topkis (1978), Vives (1990, 1999), and Milgrom and
Roberts (1990), lattice-theoretic techniques are used extensively in the eco-
nomics literature. These tools allow researchers to obtain comparative statics
results without the strong assumptions needed to apply the Implicit Function
Theorem. Although these tools have proved extremely useful, their use in
games has mainly been restricted to those with monotonic best-replies. Thus
far, this has precluded their application in important classes of games – such as
contests – which simply cannot be games of strategic complements/substitutes
(Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013). Other games, including Cournot oligopoly, re-
quire assumptions on demand and/or costs that ensure globally monotonic
best-replies (see Vives, 1999, for an overview). These assumptions rule out
important classes of inverse demand curves frequently used in applications,
such as hyperbolic demand.
In this paper, we show how lattice-theoretic tools (developed originally only
for games of strategic complements/substitutes) are useful more generally. We
first apply these tools in a (symmetric) contest under the logit contest success
function (CSF). Contests are one important class of models that cannot yield
monotone best-replies, and for which the existing literature (e.g. Dixit, 1987;
Nti, 1997) has relied exclusively on the Implicit Function Theorem. We show
that by focusing on subsets of the strategy space, the tools from supermodular
games/games of strategic complementarities can be applied to obtain a strong
regularity property on the best-response correspondence. This allows us to
derive a number of comparative statics, which hold whenever a pure-strategy
equilibrium exists. We then illustrate how our approach proves useful in other
games that have non-monotonic best replies. To do so, we examine a Cournot
oligopoly model. We obtain several comparative statics without relying on
the Implicit Function Theorem or imposing the usual assumptions (e.g., log-
concavity of inverse demand) that guarantee monotonic best-replies (see, e.g.,
Amir, 1996; Vives, 1999, 2005).
The logit CSF generalizes the model popularized by Tullock (1980), and is
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one of the most commonly used CSFs in the literature.1 The regularity prop-
erty we establish on the best-response extends a finding from Dixit (1987),
while our comparative statics extend/clarify results in Nti (1997), and com-
plement Vives (2005), Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Jensen (2016). Dixit
(1987) and Nti (1997) impose decreasing returns to scale on the contest tech-
nology, and invoke the Implicit Function Theorem. Contrasting Nti’s (1997)
results, when the contest technology exhibits increasing returns to scale, we
show that equilibrium payoffs may be strictly decreasing in the value of the
prize, and that equilibrium aggregate activity may be decreasing in the num-
ber of players. Vives (2005) studies a patent race model, which relates closely
to the logit-contest. He shows that under very mild conditions, the game
is strictly log-supermodular, thus yielding upward sloping best replies. The
logit-contest, in contrast, generally has non-monotonic best-replies, and re-
quires a different approach. Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) and Jensen (2016)
allow asymmetries between players and exploit tools from aggregative games.
We also provide conditions that ensure existence of a pure-strategy equi-
librium in the logit contest. For these results, we exploit an equivalence with
the Cournot oligopoly model, and apply findings from Amir (1996) and Amir
and Lambson (2000). These results complement the analyses of Szidarovszky
and Okuguchi (1997), Cornes and Hartley (2005), Yamakazi (2008), Acemoglu
and Jensen (2013) and Jensen (2016). These studies consider asymmetric con-
tests, but impose stronger assumptions on the returns-to-scale of the contest
technology.2
2 The logit contest
We consider a contest in which n symmetric players compete for a single prize
of common value, V . Each player, i ∈ {1, ..., n}, chooses an effort, ei ∈ R+,
according to the cost function, C : R+ → R+. If player i chooses effort ei, and
1See Corchón (2007) and Konrad (2009) for overviews of the contest literature. See
Skaperdas (1996) for an overview of the logit CSF.
2Cornes and Hartley (2005) allow for increasing returns to scale in the special case of the
Tullock CSF.
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the other n− 1 players choose efforts according to e−i ∈ Rn−1+ , the probability
that i wins is given by the logit CSF:







We refer to φ : R+ → R+ as the production function, and we call φ(ei) player
i’s “force”. The parameter, R ≥ 0, is referred to as the “discount rate”.
Following Tullock (1980), much of the contest literature sets R = 0; however,
in settings such as patent races or inducement contests, it may happen that
no player wins. R > 0 captures this possibility (see, e.g. Loury, 1979). In
the context of a patent race, an increase in R can then be interpreted as a
decrease in the likelihood that one player obtains the patent. In order to avoid
discontinuities in the payoff function and simplify our proofs, we will rule out
the case R = 0 and assume R > 0, but we discuss the case where R = 0 in
Section 2.3. When φ(x) = xr, and R = 0, the logit CSF corresponds to the








Player i chooses ei to maximize πi, taking e−i as given. We make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1.
(i) φ is continuous and strictly increasing.
(ii) C is lower semi continuous and increasing.
(iii) For all e−i ∈ Rn−1+ , lim
e→∞
π̂(e, e−i) < 0
Assumptions 1(i)-(ii) imply that greater effort strictly increases a player’s
likelihood of winning, but at a greater cost to the player. We do not require
continuity of C, which has relevant economic content, as lower semi continuity
allows for (avoidable) fixed costs. We also do not require φ(0) = 0 or C(0) = 0,
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which allows for the possibility of past sunk investments in effort. Assumption
1(iii) implies that we may, without further loss of generality, restrict attention
to effort choices e ∈ [0, e] for some arbitrarily large e > 0.
A Recasting
Let x ≡ φ(e), y ≡
∑
j 6=i φ(ej), and z ≡ x + y denote, respectively, the force
allocated to the contest by some player i, the total force of all players other than
i, and the total force. Let x = φ(0), x = φ(e), y = (n− 1)x, and y = (n− 1)x.
We can then think of the players as choosing forces directly. Since φ is strictly
increasing and continuous, the inverse function, φ−1 : [x, x] → [e, e], is well-
defined, strictly increasing, and continuous. We let κ = C ◦ φ−1.
To facilitate some comparative statics, we let κ be parameterized by some
θ ∈ R, such that if player i’s force is x, her total cost is κ(x, θ). Note that this
leaves open the possibility that θ enters the original model through φ and/or
C. Assume that κ is strictly submodular in (x, θ): for x′′ > x′ and θ′′ > θ′,
κ(x′′, θ′′)− κ(x′, θ′′) < κ(x′′, θ′)− κ(x′, θ′)
If κ is twice differentiable in e and θ, then the condition above is implied
by κxθ < 0. That is, an increase in θ strictly decreases the marginal cost of
effort. We can then write player i’s payoff as,
π(x, y) =
x
R + x+ y
V − κ(x, θ). (1)
Since the game is symmetric, we avoid the use of subscripts for ease of
notation. For any y ≥ 0 we let
X∗(y) = arg max
{
π(x, y)|x ∈ [x, x]
}
,
and let r : R+ → [x, x] denote an arbitrary single-valued selection from X∗. In
our definition of X∗ we allow y to take on any positive value, including those
outside the feasible range of [y, y]. We can thus think of X∗ as an extension
of the best-response correspondence; but in a slight abuse of terminology, we
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refer to it simply as the best-response. Our assumptions on φ and C ensure
that, for any fixed y ≥ 0, π(·, y) is upper semi continuous; since the choice set
is compact, X∗(y) is non empty (and possibly set-valued).
We divide our results into two sets. For our first set of results – in Section
2.1 – we impose no additional structure on the model. Although the exis-
tence of a pure-strategy equilibrium cannot be guaranteed, our results apply
immediately in any setting where a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium ex-
ists. For our second set of results – in Section 2.2 – we provide conditions
that ensure existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, and study how aggregate
behavior depends on the number of players. We discuss the case where R = 0
in Section 2.3. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
We focus on pure-strategy Nash equilibria; for brevity we simply write
“equilibrium”. We refer to φ and C jointly as the contest technology. We say
that the technology exhibits decreasing [increasing] returns to scale if κ(·, θ)
is convex [concave]. Throughout this paper, when we write “increasing” or
“decreasing” we mean in the weak sense; otherwise we shall write “strictly
increasing” or “strictly decreasing”.
Finally, borrowing terminology from Jensen (2016), we say i is an “absolute




; equivalently, x < [>]y + R. We let
ΦL = {(x, y) ∈ [x, x]×R+|x < y +R} denote the subset of the strategy space
in which i is an absolute favorite to lose, and let ΦW = {(x, y) ∈ [x, x]×R+|x >
y +R} denote the subset in which i is an absolute favorite to win.
2.1 Comparative statics
In this section we explore how symmetric equilibrium behavior varies with
the parameters of the model; namely, n, V , and R. A symmetric equilibrium
satisfies x∗ ∈ X∗(y∗) and x∗ = y∗
n−1 . Note that since X
∗(y) is defined for
all y ∈ R+, we need to ensure that the candidate equilibrium value of y
corresponds to a feasible strategy profile for the other players. But since
x∗ ∈ X∗(y∗) implies x∗ ∈ [x, x], clearly, y∗ = (n− 1)x∗ is feasible.
We begin by establishing a regularity property of players’ best-response
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correspondences. The following lemma is useful in doing so.
Lemma 1. Let x′′ > x′ ≥ x and y′′ > y′ ≥ 0. If x′′x′ < [>](y′′ + R)(y′ + R).
Then,
π(x′′, y′′)− π(x′′, y′) < [>]π(x′, y′′)− π(x′, y′). (2)
It is well-known that no CSF can be supermodular or submodular in own
and rivals’ efforts over its entire domain. To illustrate, suppose n = 2 and let
P denote the CSF. If the contest is decisive (i.e., one of the two players will win
the contest),3 then for all e1 and e2 it holds: P (e1, e2)+P (e2, e1) ≡ 1. Suppose
P is twice differentiable, then, P12(e1, e2) = −P12(e2, e1). It is easy to see that
this implies whenever player 1’s objective function is supermodular in (e1, e2),
then player 2’s objective function is submodular, and vice versa. Yet, Lemma
1 implies that, under the logit CSF, π is strictly submodular/supermodular
over a subset of the strategy space. Specifically, π is strictly submodular on
ΦL and strictly supermodular on ΦW .
Now, using the Implicit Function Theorem, Dixit (1987) (also see Jensen,
2016) shows that when i’s rivals increase their aggregate action, i responds
aggressively to defend her position (by increasing her action) when she is a
favorite to win, and responds timidly (by reducing her action) when she is a
favorite to lose. Using Lemma 1, our next result follows almost immediately
by Topkis’ Theorem,4 and it extends this regularity property found by Dixit
(1987).
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. Let y′′ > y′ ≥ 0, and let
x′′ ∈ X∗(y′′) and x′ ∈ X∗(y′). If x′′x′ < (y′′ + R)(y′ + R) then x′′ ≤ x′. If
x′′x′ > (y′′ +R)(y′ +R) then x′′ ≥ x′.
Lemma 2 It implies that every selection from X∗ is increasing [decreasing]
when it is fully contained in ΦW [ΦL]. Figure 1 illustrates a typical best-
response. ΦW is the region above the dashed line, x = y + R, and ΦL is the
region below this line. Note that in a symmetric equilibrium, x = y
n−1 < y+R,
3Under the logit CSF, when R > 0, the contest is not decisive. Nevertheless, a similar
logic applies.
4See, e.g., Theorem 3.1 in Vives (1990) or Theorem A.1 in Amir and Lambson (2000).
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which means any symmetric equilibrium occurs in ΦL.
5 Since each selection
from the best-response is decreasing in this region, and the “equilibrium line”,
x = y
n−1 , is strictly increasing, there can be, at most, one point of intersection
between the two. Thus any symmetric equilibrium must be unique. Our next
result states this observation formally.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. For a fixed n ≥ 2, if a
symmetric equilibrium exists, it must be unique.
Also observe in Figure 1 that an increase in n rotates the equilibrium
line downwards. It is clear from the figure that equilibrium individual force
must decrease, while the total force of i’s rivals must increase. Our next result
formalizes these observations, and also shows how payoffs vary with n. In what
follows, we let xt denote the symmetric equilibrium force when the parameter
of interest is equal to t, and analogously define yt, zt, and πt.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. For a fixed n ≥ 2, in a
symmetric equilibrium, with n′′ > n′,
(i) The individual force (and effort) is decreasing in the number of players:
xn′′ ≤ xn′.
(ii) The other players’ joint force is increasing in the number of players:
yn′′ ≥ yn′.
(iii) The expected per-player payoff is decreasing in the number of players:
πn′′ ≤ πn′.
Consistent with other results that invoke lattice-theoretic techniques, our
findings only ensure weak monotonicity of individual forces/efforts and pay-
offs in n. The following example shows that strict monotonicity cannot be
guaranteed in general.
5Note that if R = 0 and n = 2, this is no longer true, as the lines x = y+R and x = yn−1 ,















Figure 1: An example of a typical best-response correspondence (in green). Each selection
from X∗ must be increasing in the region above the line x = y + R, and decreasing in the
region below this line.
Example 1. Let V = 10, R = 0,6 x = 0, and κ(x) =

√
x x ≤ 1
(x+ 1)2 − 3 x ≥ 1
.
For each n = 2, . . . , 10 there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which all
players choose x∗ = 1.
We next study how symmetric equilibrium behavior depends on the other
parameters of the model, namely, the value of the prize, V , the discount rate,
R, and the cost parameter, θ.
Proposition 3. Fix n ≥ 2 and suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then in a
symmetric equilibrium,
(i) Individual and total forces/efforts are increasing in the value of the prize:
For V ′′ > V ′, xV ′′ ≥ xV ′ and zV ′′ ≥ zV ′.
6The main idea in this example would also hold for R strictly positive but sufficiently
small.
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(ii) Individual and total forces/efforts are increasing in the cost parameter:
For θ′′ > θ′, xθ′′ ≥ xθ′ and zθ′′ ≥ zθ′.
(iii) Individual and total forces/efforts are decreasing in the discount rate: For
R′′ > R′, xR′′ ≤ xR′ and zR′′ ≤ zR′.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 follow from the fact that π is strictly
supermodular in (x, V ) and (x, θ). By Topkis’ Theorem, an increase in either
of these parameters shifts a player’s best response upward, and leads to an
increase in individual force/effort in any symmetric equilibrium. Figure 2
illustrates: Following an increase in V or θ, the player’s best response shifts
up from the green to the blue curve, and the symmetric equilibrium increases
from the point E0 to the point E1.
x = y
n 1






Figure 2: An illustration of the impact of an increase in V or θ on the best response corre-
spondence. The green curve represents the best response before the parameter increase; the
blue curve represents the best response after the parameter increase. Following the parameter
change, the symmetric equilibrium increases from E0 to E1.
To understand part (iii) of Proposition 3, first note that π depends on R
and y insofar as it depends on the sum, y +R. Adapting Lemmas 1 and 2, it
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is straightforward to show that, for any fixed y ≥ 0, π is strictly submodular
in (x,R) on ΦL, and that any selection from X
∗ is decreasing in R whenever
X∗ is contained in ΦL. So, suppose R increases from R′ to R′′. When a
player’s best response is contained in ΦL (for both parameter values), this
portion of the best response must shift down, following the increase in the
parameter. Figure 3 illustrates; the green curve is the best response when
R = R′, and the blue curve is the best response when R = R′′ > R′. In
the region between the lines, x = y + R′ and x = y + R′′, the relationship
between the two best-response functions is difficult to ascertain in general. In
the region below the line x = y+R′, there is a clear ordering between the two,
with the best-response shifting down following the increase in the parameter.
As any symmetric equilibrium occurs below this line, we can conclude that
the symmetric equilibrium force decreases.
x = y
n 1
x = y + R0






Figure 3: An illustration of the impact of a change in R on the best response. The green curve
is the best response when R = R′; the blue curve is the best response when R = R′′ > R′.
Following an increase in R, the equilibrium decreases from E0 to E1.
We now explore the relationship between the parameters of the model, and
equilibrium payoffs. When the contest technology exhibits decreasing returns
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to scale, Nti (1997) shows that equilibrium payoffs increase in V . The next
example shows that this result does not hold in general. Indeed, equilibrium
per-player payoffs may be strictly decreasing in the prize or the cost parameter,
θ.
Example 2. Let n = 2, R = 0,7 x = 0, and
κ(x, θ) =





If 1 ≤ V θ
4
≤ 1−α

















For 0 < α < 1
2
, π∗ is is strictly decreasing in V for fixed θ, and strictly
decreasing in θ for fixed V . For instance, if α = 1
3
and θ = 1 then for





, and π∗ = 2 − V
4
. If α = 1
3
and V = 1 then for










There are two competing forces acting on a player i’s payoff following
an increase in the prize. There is a direct positive effect, since the value of
winning increases. But there is also an indirect negative effect, since i’s rivals
increase their forces. Nti (1997) shows that the direct positive effect outweighs
the indirect negative effect when the contest technology exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. With decreasing returns, higher levels of force are produced
at greater marginal cost, which dampens the indirect effect. For technologies
with increasing returns, a contrasting logic applies: Players’ optimal efforts are
more sensitive to changes in the prize, and the indirect effect is exacerbated.8
7The main idea in this example would also hold for R strictly positive but sufficiently
small.
8This effect is evident in Example 2, as ∂
2x∗
∂α∂V < 0. That is, a decrease in α, which leads
to more pronounced increasing returns to scale, implies that x∗ is more sensitive to changes
in the prize.
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As Example 2 shows, with increasing returns it may well be that the indirect
effect dominates the direct effect. A similar intuition holds for changes in θ.
While the relationship between equilibrium per-player payoffs and V /θ is
ambiguous, our next result shows that there is a clear relationship between
payoffs and R.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 1 is satisfied. In a symmetric equilib-
rium, the per-player expected payoff is decreasing in the discount rate: For
R′′ > R′, πR′ ≥ πR′′.
As with an increase in V or θ, there are two competing forces acting on
equilibrium payoffs following a decrease in R. There is a direct positive effect,
since a decrease in R increases the likelihood of a player winning the prize.
But there is an indirect negative effect caused by the increase in the efforts of
one’s rivals (see Proposition 3(iii)). As it happens, the positive effect always
outweighs the negative effect.
Although y is decreasing in R, the proof of Proposition 4 shows that the
sum, y+R, is increasing in R. To see why, consider a decrease in R from R′′ to
R′. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the parameter change: The green curve
is (a portion of) the best response when R = R′′, and the blue curve is the best
response when R = R′ < R′′. When the parameter is R′′, the total equilibrium
force of i’s rivals is y′′. Now since X∗ depends only on the sum, y + R, an
increase in R shifts the best response outwards by a horizontal distance equal
to R′′ − R′. As x′′ is a best response to y′′ when R = R′′, then x′′ must also
be a best response to ŷ = y′′+R′′−R′ when R = R′. Using the monotonicity
of the best response in the region relevant for equilibrium, it is clear from the
figure that any point of intersection between the blue best response and the
line x = y
n−1 must occur at a value y
′ ∈ [y′′, ŷ]. This means y′ +R′ ≤ y′′ +R′′.
Using this fact, it is straightforward to show that a player’s equilibrium payoff
must increase following a decrease in R.9
9Figure 4 illustrates a scenario in which y+R strictly decreases in equilibrium following
the decrease in R. But this need not be the case: Lemma 2 does not preclude the possibility
that x̂ = ŷn−1 is also a best response to ŷ when R = R
′ (although this would not be possible




x = y + R00






Figure 4: An illustration of the impact of a change in R on (a portion of) the best response
correspondence. The green curve is the best-response when R = R′′; the blue curve is the
best response when R = R′ < R′′.
Summarizing
The comparative statics results provided in Propositions 2 - 4 extend results
in Nti (1997). We have shown that neither decreasing returns to scale nor
differentiability are essential drivers of these results. Rather, the structure
imposed by the logit CSF yields payoff functions that exhibit strict increasing
[decreasing] differences over ΦW [ΦL]. This feature drives the regularity prop-
erty of the best response found by Dixit (1987), which we extend in Lemma 2.
From this property, and the fact that any symmetric equilibrium occurs in ΦL,
the comparative statics follow. But Example 2 shows that the assumption of
decreasing returns to scale is an important driver of the typical finding that
equilibrium payoffs increase in the value of the prize.
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2.2 Equilibrium existence and effects of entry
We next turn to the question of existence, and study how aggregate behavior
varies with the number of players. These results rely on the equivalence be-
tween our contest and a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with inverse demand,
V
R+Q
, and cost function κ. The results in this section are consequences of
our Proposition 1, and results in Amir and Lambson (2000). We strengthen
Assumption 1 as follows:
Assumption 2.
(i) For all e > 0, φ(e) is twice continuously differentiable with φ′(e) > 0.
Moreover, φ(0) = 0.
(ii) For all e ≥ 0, C(e) is twice continuously differentiable with C ′(e) ≥ 0.
We do not wish to rule out the Tullock CSF, which is not differentiable at
zero when r < 1. For this reason, we do not require φ(0) to be differentiable;
Assumption 2 is otherwise consistent with assumptions in Amir and Lambson
(2000).
Noting that z = x + y, a player’s payoff can be expressed, π̃(z, y) =
z−y
R+z
V −κ(z−y). We can then think of some player i as choosing the total force,
taking the total force of the other players as given. That is, player i solves,
max{π̃(z, y)|x+ y ≥ z ≥ y}. Assumption 2 ensures that κ(x) is twice contin-
uously differentiable for all x > 0. For all z > y, let ∆(z, y) denote the cross
partial derivative of π̃ with respect to z and y: ∆(z, y) = V
(R+z)2
+ κ′′(z − y).
Note that ∆ is defined on the lattice, Φ = {(z, y) ∈ R+|(n − 1)x ≥ y ≥
0, y+x ≥ z > y}. As in Amir and Lambson (2000), the sign of ∆ on Φ plays a
critical role in our analysis. When ∆ > [<]0 on Φ, π̃ is strictly supermodular
[submodular] on its domain. First we consider the case where ∆ > 0 on Φ.
Proposition 5. In addition to Assumptions 1(iii) and 2, suppose ∆ > 0 on
Φ. Then,
(i) For each n ∈ N, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and no
asymmetric equilibria.
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(ii) The equilibrium total force is increasing in n: For n′′ > n′, zn′′ ≥ zn′.
Proposition 5 provides conditions under which the existence of a unique
symmetric equilibrium can be guaranteed, and also shows that equilibrium
total force is increasing in the number of players. The existence result and the
comparative static with respect to n follows from Amir and Lambson (2000),10
while uniqueness follows by Proposition 1. The condition, ∆ > 0, limits the
returns to scale of the contest technology, but also depends on the magnitudes
of the discount rate and the prize. Jensen (2016) provides a result similar to
Proposition 5 in an asymmetric contest. In the special case where all players




φ′ , which is
equivalent to κ′′ ≥ 0.11 Note that ∆ > 0 if κ′′ ≥ 0, but ∆ may be strictly
positive even if κ is strictly concave everywhere (see Example 3 in Gama and
Rietzke, 2017).
We now consider the case where ∆ < 0. Our next two results are conse-
quences of Amir and Lambson’s (2000) Theorems 2.5 and 2.6, respectively.
Proposition 6. In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, suppose ∆ < 0 on Φ.
Then, for any n ∈ N,
(i) For any m < n, if a symmetric equilibrium exists in the m-player con-
test (with individual force xm, say) then the following configuration con-
stitutes an equilibrium for the n player contest: Each of any m players
chooses force xm while the remaining n − m players exert zero effort.
In particular, an n-player equilibrium always exists in which one player
chooses the optimal single-player effort and the other n−1 players choose
zero effort.
(ii) A unique symmetric equilibrium exists if, for each y ∈ [0, y], π(·, y) is
strictly quasiconcave.
10Note, moreover, that ∆ > 0 is a special case of Acemoglu and Jensen’s (2013) “uniform
local solvability” condition, which could also be applied to show the comparative static with
respect to n.
11Jensen’s (2016’s) Assumption 3 is a sufficient condition for the uniform solvability con-
dition to be satisfied. Relaxing Assumption 3 and instead imposing uniform local solvability,
would be equivalent to imposing ∆ > 0.
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(iii) No other equilibrium other than those described in parts (i) and (ii) can
exist.
When ∆ < 0 over its domain, several asymmetric equilibria may exist;12
moreover, there always exists an equilibrium in which n−1 players are inactive.
An equilibrium with a single active player is not standard in contests. Note
that the condition, ∆ < 0 requires κ′′ < 0 and R > 0. It should be clear that
an equilibrium with only one active player could never exist if R = 0.
Our next result shows how total equilibrium forces vary with the number
of players when ∆ < 0.
Proposition 7. In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, suppose ∆(z, y) < 0 on
Φ. Then,
(i) Under the hypothesis of Proposition 6(i), all the asymmetric equilibria
for all m < n are invariant in the number of players n.
(ii) Under the hypothesis of Proposition 6(ii), the total equilibrium force, zn,
is decreasing in n.
Proposition 7(i) clearly holds since, in the asymmetric equilibria with m <
n, an additional player exerts no effort. Proposition 7(ii) contrasts much of
the work in contests under the logit CSF.13 The intuition is akin to that of a
natural monopoly. The condition ∆ < 0 implies strong increasing returns to
scale. Limiting entry allows a player to take full advantage of her increasing
returns. Example 4 in Gama and Rietzke (2017) illustrates our finding.
Related to Proposition 7, Baye et al. (1993) show that total effort increases
if the player with the highest value is excluded in an asymmetric all-pay auc-
tion. Intuitively, the high-value player discourages effort from the other play-
ers; removing this player “levels the playing field”, and encourages greater
12Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992) and Cornes and Hartley (2005) find a similar equi-
librium structure under the Tullock CSF with r > 1. Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011)
also show the potential for multiple asymmetric equilibria under the Tullock CSF when the
size of the prize varies with efforts.
13One exception is Amegashie (1999). Under the Tullock CSF, Amegashie (1999) shows
that total effort may be decreasing in n, when a player’s prize includes a fixed component,
and a variable component, which increases linearly in a player’s effort.
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effort among the remaining players. In contrast to the Exclusion Principal,
our result applies in a symmetric contest, so there is no scope for leveling
the playing field. However, with increasing returns to scale, the addition of
another player can have a strong discouragement effect.14
2.3 The case, R = 0
Since much of the work in the contest literature utilizing the logit CSF assumes
R = 0, in this section we briefly discuss this case. The formal results discussed
herein can be found in Gama and Rietzke (2017). Our results in Section 2.1
rely heavily on the fact that any symmetric equilibrium occurs in ΦL. But
when R = 0 and n = 2, this is no longer true. In this case, multiple symmetric
equilibria may exist (at most 2); but uniqueness is restored if n > 2 or κ is
differentiable. Regardless, our comparative statics in Section 2.1 continue to
hold if one replaces “in a symmetric equilibrium” with “in the smallest and
largest symmetric equilibria”. Proposition 5 also holds when R = 0. However,
the condition ∆ < 0, which is relevant for Propositions 6 and 7, requires R > 0.
3 Cournot oligopoly
Beyond our contribution to the contest literature, this paper adds to the lit-
erature on monotone comparative statics more broadly. Our approach in the
contest demonstrates that lattice-theoretic techniques – originally developed
for games of strategic complements/substitutes – can deliver powerful insights
in games with non-monotonic best-replies. In this section we apply our ap-
proach to a symmetric Cournot oligopoly model. We will not impose the usual
assumptions that ensure globally monotonic best-replies, nor will we rely on
the Implicit Function Theorem.
Let P : R+ → R denote inverse demand and let C : R+ × R→ R+ denote
each firm’s cost function. To facilitate some comparative statics, we suppose
14The choice of CSF plays a critical role in driving the Exclusion Principle. For instance,
when marginal cost is constant, it is well-known that the result does not hold under the
Tullock CSF (See, e.g., Fang, 2002; Matros, 2006; Menicucci, 2006).
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that P is parameterized by some R ≥ 0 such that, if total output is z, the
market price is p = P (z + R), where P is strictly decreasing. R is a demand-
shift parameter; an increase in this parameter decreases the market price for
a given market output, z. Further, we assume C is parameterized by θ ∈ R
such that if a firm produces x, total cost is given by C(x, θ). We assume P
and C are twice continuously differentiable with P ′ < 0, Cx ≥ 0, and Cxθ < 0.
Thus, an increase in θ decreases marginal cost. We impose differentiability for
ease of exposition, but is not needed for our results.
If firm i chooses output, x, and the total output of the other n − 1 firms
is y, the payoff to firm i is π(x, y) = xP (x + y + R) − C(x, θ). We assume
for all y, limx→∞ π(x, y) < 0, which implies that we may restrict attention to
x ∈ [0, x] for some arbitrarily large x ∈ R++. Note that our assumptions on π
ensure that a firm’s best response correspondence is non-empty for each y.
Following the structure of our previous results, we first provide several com-
parative statics assuming existence of a symmetric equilibrium; we then discuss
conditions from the literature under which such an equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist. In what follows, we let xt denote a per-firm symmetric equilibrium
output level when the parameter of interest is equal to t and define yt, and πt
analogously. We also let zt = xt + yt denote total equilibrium output.
Proposition 8. Consider a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. Suppose there exists
n0 ≥ 2 such that,
for all z ≥ 0, P ′(z) + z
n0
P ′′(z) < 0. (3)
Then, if for n ≥ n0 a symmetric equilibrium exists, it must be unique. More-
over, in any symmetric equilibrium with n ≥ n0 firms,
(i) For n′′ > n′ ≥ n0, xn′′ ≤ xn′, yn′′ ≥ yn′, and πn′′ ≤ πn′.
(ii) For R′′ > R′, xR′′ ≤ xR′, zR′′ ≤ zR′, and πR′′ ≤ πR′.
(iii) For θ′′ > θ′, xθ′′ ≥ xθ′ and zθ′′ ≥ zθ′.
The main implication of condition (3) is that π is strictly submodular in
(x, y) on Φ0 = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|x ≤
y+R
n0−1}. It follows that every selection of a
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firm’s best response is decreasing when contained in Φ0. For n ≥ n0 a sym-
metric equilibrium satisfies x = y
n−1 ≤
y+R
n0−1 , and therefore must be contained
in Φ0. Precisely the same arguments used in the proofs of Propositions 1 -
4 can then be applied. Note that, as previously mentioned, differentiability
is imposed only for ease of exposition. One could alternatively replace con-
dition (3) with the assumption that π is strictly submodular on Φ0, and the
conclusion of Proposition 8 would hold.
Our next result in this section shows that the hypothesis of Proposition 8
is always satisfied if P ′ is bounded away from 0 and P ′′ is bounded away from
+∞.
Proposition 9. If there exists ε > 0 and B < ∞ such that, |P ′| > ε and
P ′′ < B, then the hypothesis of Proposition 8 is satisfied.
Turning to existence of equilibrium, Theorem 2.7 in Amir and Lambson
(2000) shows that an equilibrium exists so long as ∆̃(x, z) = P ′(z)−C ′′(x) 6= 0
for all z ≥ x ≥ 0. Although asymmetric equilibria may exist, in any of these
equilibria all active firms (those producing non-zero output) must produce
the same level of output. So, under the condition ∆̃ 6= 0, our Proposition
8 applies in any equilibrium of the Cournot game with m ≥ n0 active firms.
Alternatively, Theorem 2.1 in Amir and Lambson (2000) shows that a sym-
metric equilibrium exists and no asymmetric equilibria exist if ∆̃ > 0. Under
this condition, our Proposition 8 implies that for n ≥ n0, this equilibrium is
unique.
Discussion
The standard approach to comparative statics relies on first-order conditions
together with assumptions sufficient to ensure the validity of the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem (see, e.g., Seade, 1980; Novshek, 1980). Following this approach
and temporarily ignoring the integer constraint on n, one could show that if
∆̃ > 0 then, a condition similar to condition (4) would imply dxn
dn
< 0 (see, e.g.
Vives, 2008, Proposition 4). However, as noted by Vives (2005), this approach
is fraught with shortcomings. In particular, it leads to ambiguous conclusions
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if ∆̃ < 0; moreover, it delivers no meaningful results in the presence of fixed
costs (implying non-differentiable cost functions).
The alternative approach, using lattice-theoretic techniques, relies on con-
ditions sufficient to ensure globally monotone best responses (see Vives, 1999,
2005, for overviews). Consider the following condition:
For all z ≥ 0, P ′(z) + zP ′′(z) < 0. (4)
Under Condition (4) the Cournot game is a strictly submodular game, and
therefore every selection from the best response is globally decreasing. Novshek
(1985) used condition (4) to prove existence of an equilibrium (without im-
posing symmetry). Vives (1990) later established the link between Novshek’s
(1985) result and the theory of supermodular games. Acemoglu and Jensen
(2013) extend Novshek’s (1985) finding to a general class of submodular ag-
gregative games and derive a number of comparative statics (see also, Jensen,
2010). Amir (1996) provides an alternative condition – namely, log-concavity
of inverse demand – which implies that the Cournot game is ordinally sub-
modular and therefore is one of strategic substitutes.
Hyperbolic inverse demand is one example of a commonly used functional
form, which is log-convex and also does not satisfy (4). If P is log-convex
and C ≡ 0, then the game is log-supermodular and best replies are globally
increasing (Amir, 1996). Amir and Lambson (2000) uses this property to show
that extremal equilibrium per-firm outputs increase with entry. Otherwise,
with log-convex inverse demand and arbitrary costs, it might appear as though
one is relegated to rely on the Implicit Function Theorem for comparative
statics. Indeed, prior analyses of the logit contest (which is a special case
of the Cournot model with hyperbolic demand) have relied on this approach.
Our approach, on the other hand, offers useful and powerful insights for this
type of application. Example 3 illustrates.
Example 3. Let P (z) = (z + R)−γ, where γ > 0 and R > 0. Let C be
any (non-trivial) cost function. For any n > γ + 1, and z ≥ 0, we have
P ′(z) + z
n
P ′′(z) = γ[z(1+γ−n)−nR]
n(z+R)2+γ
< 0. Proposition 8 applies and therefore, if a
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symmetric equilibrium exists in the game with n′′ > n′ ≥ γ + 1 firms, it must
be unique; moreover, xn′′ ≤ xn′.
We close this section by noting the relationship between our Proposition 8
and results on large markets in the Cournot oligopoly (Novshek, 1980; Bamón
and Frayssé, 1985; Vives, 1999, Sec. 4.4). In a market with r consumers, each






Under relatively mild conditions on inverse demand, when r is sufficiently large,
the analogue of condition (4) will hold. In consequence, best-replies will be
monotonically decreasing (globally); existence and a number of comparative
statics can be then be obtained using known results. Our condition (3) is
in the same spirit, but is conceptually quite distinct from these replication
results. For one, under condition (3) n sufficiently large is not enough to
ensure existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Second, our condition does
not imply globally monotone best-replies even when n is sufficiently large. Our
condition, instead, ensures monotonicity of best-replies only on a restricted
subset of the strategy space. Assuming a symmetric equilibrium exists, this is
enough to generate meaningful comparative statics.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we used lattice-theoretic techniques to derive a number of com-
parative statics results in a logit contest. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper to apply these tools in contests. We then obtained a number
of comparative statics in a Cournot oligopoly model without relying on the
Implicit Function Theorem, or imposing the usual assumptions that ensure
global monotonicity of the best replies. Our approach illustrates how lattice-
theoretic techniques can be applied to obtain meaningful comparative statics
results in games with non-monotonic best-replies.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let x′′ > x′ ≥ x and y′′ > y′ ≥ 0. Let ỹ′′ = y′′+R and ỹ′ = y′+R. The reader













which holds if and only if x′′x′ < [>]ỹ′′ỹ′.
Proof of Lemma 2
We will show the first statement in the lemma; the proof of the second state-
ment is analogous. Let y′′ > y′ ≥ 0, x′′ ∈ X∗(y′′) and x′ ∈ X∗(y′). Suppose
x′′x′ < (y′′ + R)(y′ + R). Proceed by contradiction: Suppose, contrary to the
lemma, x′′ > x′. Then by Lemma 1,
0 ≤ π(x′′, y′′)− π(x′, y′′) < π(x′′, y′)− π(x′, y′) ≤ 0,
where the l.h.s. inequality follows since x′′ ∈ X∗(y′′), and the r.h.s. inequality
follows since x′ ∈ X∗(y′).15 We have a contradiction; hence it must be that
x′′ ≤ x′.
Proof of Proposition 1
Fix n ≥ 2. We show that if a symmetric equilibrium exists, it must be unique.
Let x1 and x2 be two symmetric equilibrium levels of force, and let let yi = (n−
1)xi, i = 1, 2. Proceed by contradiction, and suppose that these two equilibria
are distinct; in particular, suppose x1 > x2; equivalently, y1 > y2. Note that
for i = 1, 2, xi and yi satisfy: xi ∈ X∗(yi) and xi = yin−1 . But since
yi
n−1 ≤ yi,
it must hold that xi < yi + R for i = 1, 2; hence, x1x2 < (y1 + R)(y2 + R).
15The choice set, [x, x], is independent of y, so x′ (x′′) is certainly feasible when others’
joint force is y′′ (y′).
22
Since y1 > y2 (by assumption), Lemma 2 implies x1 ≤ x2, which yields a
contradiction. Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium must be unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
Parts (i)-(ii)
Fix n′′ > n′, and suppose that a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists
in the n′′ and n′ player contests. From the arguments in the first part of this
proof, we know that the symmetric equilibrium must be unique. Let x′′ (x′)
denote the individual equilibrium individual force when the contest has n′′
(respectively, n′) players; let y′′ = (n′′ − 1)x′′ and y′ = (n′ − 1)x′.
We first show part (ii). First note that if y′ ≤ (n′′− 1)x, then as feasibility
requires y′′ ≥ (n′′ − 1)x, it follows that y′′ ≥ y′. Then suppose y′ > (n′′ − 1)x.
We will show that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium with y < y′ when
n = n′′. Fix y0 ∈ [(n′′ − 1)x, y′), and let x0 ∈ X∗(y0). Clearly if x0 ≥ y0 + R
then x0 >
y0
n′′−1 . If x0 < y0 + R, then Lemma 2 implies x0 ≥ x
′. But since






n′′−1 ; thus, x0 >
y0
n′′−1 .
We have now established that for all y ∈ [(n′′ − 1)x, y′), x ∈ X∗(y) implies
x > y
n′′−1 ; thus, there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium with y < y
′ when
n = n′′. It follows that y′′ ≥ y′. This establishes part (ii).
Next, we show x′′ ≤ x′. We have already shown that y′′ ≥ y′. If y′′ = y′





′. If y′′ > y′ then since x′′ < y′′+R
and x′ < y′ + R, Lemma 2 implies x′′ ≤ x′. Since individual force decreases
following the increase in n, clearly individual effort decreases as well. This
establishes part (i).
Part (iii)
Let π′′ (π′) denote the equilibrium individual expected payoff in the contest













R + x′′ + y′′
V − κ(x′′)
= π′′
The first inequality holds by definition of x′. The second inequality follows
since, as we showed in part (ii), y′′ ≥ y′. This establishes part (iii) and the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We prove parts (i) and (ii) jointly. Fix n, and let t denote either the parameter
V or θ. It is easily verified that π is strictly supermodular in t and x. By
Topkis’ Theorem (see, e.g. Topkis, 1978, or Theorem A.1 in Amir and Lambson
(2000)), it follows that any selection, r(·), from X∗ is increasing in t for each
y. It is clear that this implies that any intersection between a player’s reaction
curve and the line x = y
n−1 must lie further from the origin following an
increase in t. Since individual force increases, then individual effort and total
force/effort must increase, as n is fixed. This proves parts (i) and (iii).
Next, we show part (iii). Let R′′ > R′, and suppose a symmetric equilib-
rium exists for both parameter values. Let x′′ and x′ denote the symmetric
equilibrium individual force when the parameter is R′′, respectively R′. Let
y′′ = (n − 1)x′′ and y′ = (n − 1)x′. Since π depends on y and R insofar as it
depends on the sum, y+R, X∗ depends only on this sum. We write X∗(y+R)
to denote the set of best-replies to y when the parameter is R. Note that our
result follows immediately if x′′ = x; so, assume x′′ > x; equivalently, y′′ > y.
Let ŷ = R′′ − R′ + y′′ > y′′. By construction, ŷ + R′ = y′′ + R′′; therefore,
X∗(ŷ+R′) = X∗(y′′+R′′). By definition of x′′, this means x′′ ∈ X∗(ŷ+R′). We
now show that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium in which y < y′′ when
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R = R′. Fix y0 ∈ [y, y′′), and let x0 ∈ X∗(y0 + R′). Clearly, if x0 > y0 + R′
then x0 >
y0
n−1 . If x0 ≤ y0 + R
′, then since x′′ ≤ y′′ < ŷ + R′, it holds
x0x
′′ < (y0 + R′)(ŷ + R′). As, x0 ∈ X∗(y0 + R′), x′′ ∈ X∗(ŷ + R′), and





We have now shown that for all y ∈ [y, y′′), x ∈ X∗(y+R′) implies x > y
n−1 ;
thus, there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium in which y < y′′ when R = R′.
It therefore must be that y′ ≥ y′′; equivalently, x′ ≥ x′′. Since individual force
increases following a decrease in R, then individual effort and total force/effort
must increase, as n is fixed. This establishes part (iii) and the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let R′′ > R′ and suppose that a symmetric equilibrium exists for both pa-
rameter values. Let x′′ (x′) denote the equilibrium per-player force when the
parameter is R′′ (R′). Let y′′ = (n − 1)x′′ and y′ = (n − 1)x′. Finally, let
X∗(y +R) denote the best response to y when the parameter is R.16
Let ŷ = y′′+R′′−R′ > y′′. As we showed in the proof of Proposition 3(ii),
it must be that x′′ ∈ X∗(ŷ + R′). Moreover, since x′′ = y′′
n−1 <
ŷ
n−1 < ŷ + R
′,
Lemma 2 implies that for all y > ŷ, if x ∈ X∗(y + R′) and x < y + R′, then
x ≤ x′′ < y
n−1 . Thus, there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium with y > ŷ
when R = R′. Therefore, y′ ≤ ŷ, which implies y′ + R′ ≤ ŷ + R′ = y′′ + R′′.
Next, let π′′ (π′) denote the equilibrium payoff to a player when the parameter
is R′′ (respectively, R′). It holds,
π′ =
x′








x′′ + y′′ +R′′
V − κ(x′′)
= π′′
16Recall from the proof of Proposition 3(ii) that a player’s best response depends on y
and R insofar as it depends on the sum, y +R.
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The first inequality follows by definition of x′; the second follows since
y′′ +R′′ ≥ y′ +R′. This establishes the proposition.
Proof of Propositions 5-7
The contest is equivalent to a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with inverse de-
mand function P̃ (z) = V
R+z
, and cost function, C̃(x) = κ(x). The existence
of a symmetric equilibrium, and non-existence of any asymmetric equilibria
established in Proposition 5 follows from Theorem 2.1 in Amir and Lamb-
son (2000). The uniqueness of this equilibrium follows from Proposition 1.
Part (ii) of Proposition 5 follows immediately by Theorem 2.2(b) in Amir and
Lambson (2000). Propositions 6 and 7 follow by Amir and Lambson’s (2000)
Theorems 2.5 and 2.6, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 8
We first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Fix n0 ∈ N. If P ′(z)+ zn0P
′′(z) < 0 for all z ≥ 0 then ∂2
∂x∂y
π(x, y, R, θ) <
0 for all (x, y) ∈ Φ0 ≡ {(x′, y′) ∈ R2+|0 ≤ x′ ≤
y′+R
n0−1}.
Proof. Let n0 ∈ N be given, and suppose for all z ≥ 0, P ′(z) + zn0P
′′(z) < 0.
Let (x, y) ∈ Φ0 be given, where Φ0 is as defined in the lemma. We want to show
∂2
∂x∂y
π(x, y, R, θ) = P ′(x+ y +R) + xP ′′(x+ y +R) < 0. If P ′′(x+ y +R) ≤ 0
then we are done; so, suppose P ′′(x+ y+R) > 0. Let z = x+ y+R. We have
the following string of inequalities:




= P ′(x+ y +R) +
x+ y +R
n0
P ′′(x+ y +R)
≥ P ′(x+ y +R) + x+ (n0 − 1)x
n0
P ′′(x+ y +R)
= P ′(x+ y +R) + xP ′′(x+ y +R)
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The strict inequality holds by the supposition of the lemma. The first
equality holds by our choice of z. The first weak inequality holds since P ′′(x+
y) > 0 (by assumption) and since (x, y) ∈ Φ0 implies x(n0 − 1) ≤ y +R. The
lemma follows.
Lemma 3 implies that, under the hypothesis of the proposition, π is strictly
submodular in (x, y) on Φ0 = {(x, y) ∈ R2+|x ≤
y+R
n0−1}. By Topkis’ Theo-
rem, whenever the best response is contained in Φ0, every selection must be




n0−1 . That is, any symmetric equilibrium with n ≥ n0 firms occurs
in Φ0. In this region, the best response is strongly decreasing. Uniqueness of
any symmetric equilibrium follows from identical arguments made in the proof
of Proposition 1. The comparative statics in parts (i) - (iii) follow from similar
arguments as made in the proof of Propositions 2, 3, and 4.
Proof of Proposition 9
Fix z ≥ 0. It suffices to show that limn→∞ P ′(z) + znP
′′(z) < 0. But
limn→∞ P ′(z) +
z
n
P ′′(z) ≤ limn→∞−ε+ znB = −ε < 0.
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